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I E S EMORE THAN TWO ARE A CROWD.
DIFFERENT PATHS TO EFFECTIVENESS
IN DYADIC AND MULTI-PARTY JOINT VENTURES
Abstract
Using data from 87 joint venture (JV) experiences, we compared the effectiveness of
dyadic and multi-party JVs. We show that dyadic JVs are more effective than multi-party
ones, and that the conditions resulting in an enhanced effectiveness differ for the two groups:
while relational embeddedness significantly influences the effectiveness of dyadic JVs,
monitoring mechanisms are pivotal in the case of multi-party JVs.
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DIFFERENT PATHS TO EFFECTIVENESS
IN DYADIC AND MULTI-PARTY JOINT VENTURES
Introduction
Researchers studying strategic alliances have called attention to the need to take into
account the context in which alliances are embedded, arguing that the study of alliance
evolution incorporating embeddedness conditions is an under-explored area of research
(Koza and Lewin, 1998). Alliances are embedded in, and their evolution is influenced by, the
partners' strategies, the social network of external contacts, industry practices, and regulatory,
institutional and cultural environments (Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997; Gulati, 1998; Koza
and Lewin, 1998). Embedded relationships between partners have been analyzed as
determinants of alliance performance or duration (Levinthal and Fichman, 1988; Kogut,
1989; Park and Russo, 1996). However, although there is some evidence that alliances with
embedded ties last longer than others, we do not fully know “the extent to which [these
alliances] perform better or worse than others and why” (Gulati 1998: 309).
A second area that remains under-researched pertains to the differences between
dyadic and multi-party alliances. Most studies on alliances develop their argument for the
dyadic case, and suggest that the argument could be easily applied to multi-party alliances. Few
have examined the effects introduced by the number of partners in an alliance. Gulati (1995a)
and García-Canal (1996) argue that multi-party alliances are more difficult to govern than
dyadic alliances, and Park and Russo (1996) predict a higher rate of failure in multi-party
alliances. The literature has thus recognized that multi-party alliances occasion additional
complexity, although the causes and consequences of this remain to a certain extent unexplored.
This study sheds light on these two research questions, analyzing the influence that
one particular set of relationships (the overall relationships with the alliance partner) and the
number of partners have on the effectiveness of one type of alliance, namely joint ventures
(JVs). We argue in this paper that there are differences in the effectiveness of dyadic and
multi-party JVs, and that each of these two types of JV follows a different path to achieve
effectiveness. The origin of these differences lies in the different incentives that exist to carry
out relational investments, i.e. to make any kind of effort to comprehend the partner’s goals
and to facilitate joint interaction. In dyadic JVs, the greater possibilities of developing the
relationship favor investment in relational assets and, eventually, the embedding of the
alliance in a network, which favors its being structured as a self-enforcing agreement. In
multi-party JVs, in contrast, faced with the impossibility of structuring the JV in this way, the
path to effectiveness is via monitoring efforts.The structure of the present paper is as follows: in the first section a conceptual
framework is presented for analyzing the influence of the number of partners on the
effectiveness of JVs. At the same time, the different paths to effectiveness followed by dyadic
and multi-party JVs are considered, and some hypotheses are formulated. Subsequently, these
hypotheses are tested empirically, using the results of a survey on the effectiveness of JVs.
Testing was carried out by estimating a number of ordered probit models, given the
categorical and hierarchical nature of the dependent variable employed. After discussion of
the results, the main conclusions are presented.
Paths to joint venture effectiveness
Two or more companies engage in a JV when the value they expect to derive from it
is greater than the value they could derive from any alternative organizational arrangement.
However, the realized value will usually be lower than the potential value (Madhok and
Tallman, 1998). The potential value depends on the synergies that the partners expect to
derive from sharing their resources. The realized value depends on the quality of the
relationship stemming from the relational investments made by the partners: all other things
being equal, the higher the quality of the relationship, the higher the realized value.  This
paper focuses not on the potential value but on the realized value, understood as
“effectiveness”, or the extent to which the focal partner's goals for the alliance are fulfilled.  
Relational quality is an outcome of the relational investments undertaken by the
partners. These investments include the managerial time, energy, and effort dedicated to the
relationship (Madhok and Tallman, 1998). Building on Ring and Van de Ven (1994) and Doz
(1996), Ariño and de la Torre (1998) propose an evolutionary model of inter-firm
collaboration that helps explain the genesis of relational quality. After early negotiation and
commitments that set the initial conditions for a JV, execution of those commitments allows
each company to learn about its partner (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Doz, 1996). The
venture is then evaluated in terms of its efficiency and equity, and so is the inter-partner
relationship quality. If the venture is judged to be within acceptable efficiency, equity, and
relationship quality boundaries, the partners will go on executing their commitments.
However, external changes may affect the efficiency and equity conditions in such a way that
they go outside those acceptable boundaries. A company may react by engaging in a process
of renegotiation with its partner so as to readjust their contributions and/or the distribution
rules. If this renegotiation is successful, the partners will execute their new commitments, and
the venture will be re-evaluated accordingly. Successful renegotiation of conditions also
enhances the quality of the relationship, as the partners have been able to air their differences.
However, if renegotiation is unsuccessful or if one of the companies reacts unilaterally to
external changes instead of engaging in a renegotiation process, the relationship quality will
suffer. A deteriorated relationship may eventually lead to the dissolution of the venture.
As this evolutionary model shows, the process by which relational quality is built up
takes an important amount of relational investments in terms of managerial time, energy, and
effort. As sense-making processes take place throughout the negotiation, commitment, and
execution stages (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994), the partners get to understand each other's
goals. If not enough effort is put into the process, incompatibilities will surface sooner or
later, as the evidence provided by Ariño and de la Torre (1998) shows. Each company will
behave driven by its own interests, which typically will only overlap with those of the partner
(Ariño, 1995). As a consequence, relational quality will decline and fulfillment of the
partners' goals for the venture will suffer. 
2Relational quality is more difficult to build and maintain when more partners are
involved in the venture. As the number of partners increases, there are more interests to be
harmonized, and problems of coordination increase (García-Canal, 1996). The number of
dyadic relationships increases geometrically with the number of partners, as do the chances
of one relationship becoming conflictive (Park and Russo, 1996). What is more, as the
number of partners increases, the incentive for one or other of them to engage in free-rider
behavior grows (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Stigler, 1974; Grandori, 1987; Salas, 1989).
Sense-making processes become more complex and the possibilities of ex post disagreement
about the initial goals increase (Park and Russo, 1996). Other things being equal, the quality
of the relationship will be lower as the number of partners increases, and a lower level of
effectiveness will be achieved. 
It would seem reasonable to assume that the major quantitative and qualitative leap
with regard to the effect that the number of partners has on effectiveness occurs with the
change from two to three partners. This is when there appears the risk of coalitions being
formed between the different partners and communication between them becoming more
difficult, since the number of communication channels has increased from one to three
(Pfeffer and Slancik, 1978). We therefore make the following hypothesis:
H1. In JVs created by only two partners there is a greater likelihood that the
partners will be able to fulfill their goals than in JVs created by more than two partners.
If this hypothesis is confirmed, two relevant questions arise. First, why do relational
investments improve the effectiveness of dyadic JVs relative to multi-party JVs? And second,
what alternative mechanisms can ensure effectiveness in multi-party JVs?
The effectiveness of dyadic JVs: Self-enforcing agreements capitalizing on relational
investments
There are three important differences between the two partner relationship and the
more than two partner relationship that condition the decision to make relational investments.
The first is that, other things being equal, the initial investment in developing the relationship
is lower in the case of two partners. Each additional partner requires an extra effort on the
part of the other companies in order to learn their organizational routines and goals. Hence,
every new partner entry means an increase in the relational investments required for the
normal operation of the JV. The second difference is that the “shadow of the future”
(Axelrod, 1984; Parkhe, 1993b) is greater in alliances of only two partners: it is easier to
define new joint action projects that are equally attractive to all the partners, since the number
of interests to be harmonized is lower. A third difference is that reciprocity is easier to
implement in two partner alliances (Parkhe, 1993b).
For the above reasons, the structuring of JVs as self-enforcing agreements in which
the partners develop and profit from previous relational investments is easier in the dyadic
case. In fact, when there are only two partners, it is easier for them to accumulate reciprocal
knowledge, which may be profited from and applied to the different cooperative projects they
may undertake in the future. In other words, relational investments are, ceteris paribus, lower,
and the time horizon in which they are to be profited from is greater. The mechanism of
reciprocity, on the other hand, reinforces the incentives to maintain cooperative behavior and
allows relational investments to be marked out with the other partner: it is easier to identify
whether the other partner is making an effort to invest in the relationship, and decide how to
act in consequence.
3In this context, the factors that reduce the need to carry out relational investments
and/or that increase the shadow of the future favor the structuring of the JV as a self-
enforcing agreement and hence the likelihood of achieving goals. Conversely, the factors that
increase the need for relational investments and/or reduce the shadow of the future reduce the
likelihood of achieving goals. The existence of previous cooperative relationships produces
the former effect and direct competition between partners the latter.
Previous cooperative relationships. JVs created by partners that have already
maintained satisfactory cooperative relationships on previous occasions start off with high
levels of relational quality. Thus, the relational investments needed at the beginning of all
cooperation projects are reduced. Specifically, there are three beneficial effects of the
existence of satisfactory previous relations. Firstly, each company has developed specific
knowledge about its partner, along with routines for joint interaction (Levinthal and Fichman,
1988; Gulati, 1995b; Zaheer and Venkatraman; 1995;  Saxton, 1997), which guarantee that
the sense-making processes necessary for joint interaction have been produced. Secondly, the
two sides have acquired a reputation for living up to their agreements that reduces risks in
future cooperations (Buckley and Casson, 1988; Parkhe, 1993a). Finally, when previous
cooperative relationships are still in force, their existence offers an additional basis for
reciprocity in the relationship since there are more channels for penalizing breaches of
contracted obligations (Kogut, 1989; Park and Russo, 1996). We therefore make the
following hypothesis:
H2. In JVs created by two partners, the existence of previous cooperative
relationships increases the likelihood of achieving the goals for which the JV was
created.
Direct competition between partners. If the partners are direct competitors, the
initial levels of relational quality are naturally not very favorable. Two other factors reduce
the incentives to invest in relational assets. Firstly, if the partners are competitors, they have
more incentive to take advantage of each other by trying to gain access to each other’s
competencies, thus paying less attention to the JV’s common goals. When the partners have
this kind of hidden agenda, it is difficult to structure the relationship as a self-enforcing
agreement (Ariño, 1997) since there are incentives not to continue collaborating indefinitely.
It is easier for the partners to absorb (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) each other’s competencies
when they are direct competitors (Park and Russo, 1996). And since they compete in the
same business, it is easier for them to apply these competencies immediately. Secondly, if the
partners are competitors, it is difficult to define cooperative projects that are satisfactory to
both. Competition facilitates the emergence of conflicting interests (Park and Ungson, 1997),
which reduces the shadow of the future and once more makes the structuring of the JV as a
self-enforcing agreement more difficult.
The above reasoning allows us to formulate the following hypothesis:
H3. In JVs created by two partners, the likelihood that the partners will be
able to achieve the goals for which the JV was created is lower when the partners
are direct competitors.
4Effectiveness of multi-party JVs: Avoiding free riding through monitoring mechanisms
The difficulty of developing projects among several partners and the high initial
relational investments —at least compared with cooperation between two partners— make it
extremely difficult for this type of JV to be structured as a self-enforcing agreement. The
success of the relationship therefore depends on the JV being structured to include
mechanisms that overcome the natural incentive for free rider behavior, while at the same
time guaranteeing and/or facilitating the development of sense-making processes that make
the partners’ relationship and joint action congruent.
Following Alchian and Demsetz (1972), it is worth pointing out that the main
solution to free rider problems in teams —and JVs may be considered teams— is supervision
of individual contributions. Although these authors advocate specialization in the supervising
function, supervision may be the joint responsibility of all the members of the team.
Translating these solutions to the field of JVs, two possible applications are worth noting: the
JV’s CEO has a share in its equity, and one partner has dominant control of the venture.
Equity share for the JV’s CEO. The task of managing a multi-party JV is, ceteris
paribus, more complex than that of managing a two partner JV, since it is more difficult to
harmonize interests. The work of the CEO therefore has greater impact on the results. Giving
her a stake in the company’s residual value would therefore be an effective form of
performance incentive, as she would take upon herself part of the variability resulting from
her work (Barzel, 1989). It would also discourage her from promoting or participating in
subgroups or factions within the JV (Pearce, 1997). Finally, it would give her more room for
for maneuver in settling disputes among the partners —and more authority to negotiate
individually with each partner— with the consequent improvement in relationships between
the partners. We may therefore expect that:
H4: Multi-party JVs in which the CEO is a shareholder are more likely to
achieve the goals the partners have established.
Dominant control. Having a dominant partner —who owns more than 50% of the
capital or a much larger share than the rest— facilitates decision-making and hence
coordination, while symmetry in ownership of the capital may make the JV more prone to
conflict. This is the view put forward by Killing (1983), who obtained some evidence of this,
as did Park and Ungson (1997). One partner’s having a greater share in the JV’s residual
assets would be an incentive for that partner to discipline and control the other partners. We
therefore make the following hypothesis:
H5: In multi-party JVs, those in which there is a dominant partner are more
likely to achieve the sought after goals.
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Data collection and sample
In order to test the hypotheses formulated above, a survey was conducted among
Spanish companies that had been involved in setting up JVs. The JVs were detected by
means of an analysis of press clippings published in the daily newspaper Expansión —the
leading financial newspaper in Spain— between 1986 and 1992. The search was cut off at the
end of 1992 so as to leave a sufficient amount of time between the creation of the JV and the
time of the study. At the same time, we considered only press clippings relating to JVs in
which at least one member was Spanish. We focussed on JVs with Spanish members in order
to homogenize the sample, as well as for reasons of representativeness. In this way, we
identified 438 Spanish companies that had participated in JVs, with a total of 656
participations.
The main reason for relying on Spanish companies is that since the Spanish
economy was opened up and allowed to integrate with the European and world economy
during the 70s and 80s, Spanish companies have been forced to engage in a fair number of
JVs –and strategic alliances in general– in order to gain access to new technologies and/or
markets. Hence, focussing on JVs created by Spanish companies gave us an assurance that
we would be able to obtain sufficient empirical evidence of the new types of JVs that have
arisen worldwide since the end of the 70s.
In order to obtain information on the characteristics of their participation in JVs and
the circumstances in which this occurred, a questionnaire was mailed to the companies
detected. Each questionnaire dealt with the respondent’s participation in one particular JV. A
maximum of three questionnaires was sent per company, so as to encourage them to reply. In
selecting JV experiences, priority was given to criteria such as the scale of the collaboration
project, and the diversity with regard to variables such as the number and nationality of the
partners. The questionnaires were addressed to the company’s CEO. They were first sent out
at the beginning of January 1997, with a second mailing approximately two months later,
together with a follow-up phone call. Completed questionnaires continued to be received
until June of that year, and the following months were spent screening and, when necessary,
completing missing information by contacting the person in question by phone or fax.  
A total of 609 questionnaires were sent to 431 Spanish companies. Of these, 99 were
returned, and 87 were considered valid for this study (the rest were discarded for various
reasons, mainly because they referred to forms of cooperation other than JVs or because they
contained insufficient information). Table 1 shows the industry groups to which the
companies in the sample and those that responded to the questionnaire belonged.
6Table 1. Distribution of sample and respondents by industry groups
(In percent)
Dependent variable and method of analysis
As mentioned earlier, this study focuses on effectiveness, understood as the degree
to which the partners achieve the goals for which the JV was created. Information relating to
this aspect was therefore sought in the questionnaire. Specifically, the companies were asked
to indicate their degree of agreement with the following statement: “The goals for which this
JV was created have been completely achieved”. Their degree of agreement was indicated by
means of an interval scale of 0 to 6, where 0 corresponded to “Totally disagree” and 6 to
“Totally agree”. This assessment allowed us to construct a categorical and hierarchical
variable in which the scores given in each case reflected only one ranking, an increase from 1
to 2 in this variable not being considered equivalent to an increase from 2 to 3. This means
that it is not appropriate to use ordinary least square estimates. Conventional dummy
dependent variable methods, such as a multinomial probit or logit, are not appropriate either
since they do not take into account the additional information contained in the ordering of the
variable categories. Thus, given the nature of the dependent variable, a number of ordered
probit models were estimated (McElvey and Zavoina, 1975; Greene, 1993) to test the
hypotheses formulated above. The ordered probit model is constructed around a latent
regression with the form:




Metals and minerals 1.0
Energy and water 6.2 11.0
Construction 3.6 1.4
Textiles, leather, clothing and shoes 4.5 2.7
Paper and wood 3.8 1.4
Chemicals 4.8 8.2
Computers and semiconductors 1.9
Other electric and electronic products 6.2 9.6
Automobiles 1.2 1.4
Aerospace 0.7 2.7
Other machinery 3.1 4.1
Other manufacturing 6.0 8.2
Transportation 1.7 4.1




Computer software  2.2 1.4
CASES 431 73Where Y* is an unobservable index —which in this case measures the degree of
achievement of the goals—, a is the independent term, b the vector of coefficients associated
with the independent variables (defined below), and e the random disturbance term. Our
observations were limited to assigning each company to one category on an interval scale (0
to 6), where each category corresponds to a specific range of Y*, such that:
Y= 0 if Y* £0; Y= 1 if 0<Y* £m1; Y= 2 if m1<Y* £m2; ... Y= 6 if m5<Y*
where µi are unknown parameters that determine the boundary values of each range. Once
we have assumed the distribution that e follows —in the case of the ordered probit, a normal
distribution (1)— we estimate the parameters under study using maximum likelihood
techniques. From these estimations we obtain a coefficient associated with each independent
variable that indicates that variable’s (positive or negative) impact on the likelihood that, in
this case, the JV’s goals will be achieved. The estimations also give the boundary values µi
that define the intervals, and that must be ordered hierarchically. The estimations were
obtained using the routines included for this purpose in the LIMDEP 7.0 program. To test for
the existence of no-response bias with respect to the degree of goal achievement, we tested
for the existence of significant differences in this variable among the first and last groups of
questionnaires returned, without finding any significant difference.
Independent variables 
We used the following independent variables in our estimations:
The Two Partners variable was used to test Hypothesis 1, concerning the influence
of the number of partners on the likelihood of achieving goals. This is a dummy variable that
equals 1 when the number of partners is two and 0 otherwise. In defining this variable, we
considered alliances between two companies in which one owns 100% of the other’s capital,
or both are 100% owned by a third company, as sole proprietorships. Also, in cases where the
JV’s CEO had an equity stake, the CEO herself was not counted as one of the partners.
The following two variables were used to test Hypotheses 2 and 3 (relational
factors), respectively:
Previous alliances: a variable that measures how important the existence of a
good relationship with any of the other partners, established in other earlier
alliances, was in creating the JV in question. Specifically, this variable is the product
of a dummy variable that equals 1 when the company under study had maintained
previous cooperative relationships with any of its partners and another variable that
measures —using a scale from 1 to 7— whether the previous relationship had been
decisive in the creation of the JV under study.
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(1) The choice of a logistical distribution leads to the estimation of an ordered logit model. Greene (1993)
points out that this is a trivial decision in the sense that it does not translate into relevant differences in the
results.Competitors: a dummy variable that equals 1 when any of the partners was a
direct competitor of the company under study and 0 otherwise.
The following two variables were used to test Hypotheses 4 and 5 (monitoring
mechanisms), respectively:
CEO Shareholder: a dummy variable that equals 1 when the C.E.O. of the JV
is a shareholder and 0 otherwise.
Dominant Partner: a dummy variable that equals 1 when one of the partners
owns more than 50% of the shares of the JV or a much greater share than the other
partners (in the opinion of the company under study), and 0 otherwise.
At the same time, we included the following control variables in the
estimations we carried out:
Experience: this variable measures the company’s experience in managing
JVs. We approximated this experience with the number of JVs which the company
under study had participated in since 1986. This variable was included because a
number of different studies have analyzed its influence on the success of alliances.
Westney (1988), for instance, considers that the (favorable) experience of a company
in the management of alliances facilitates the exploitation and internal diffusion of
the partners’ knowledge in subsequent alliances, as well as developing the capacity
to manage the relationship with these partners. Likewise, Barkema et al. (1997)
found that a company’s prior experience in domestic JVs increased the life of
international JVs.
EU Partners and Non-EU Partner: these are two dummy variables related to
the cultural distance between partners, which is one of the factors most frequently
analyzed as determining the effectiveness of a JV. EU Partners equals 1 for
international JVs in which all the partners come from European Union countries,
excluding Spain, and 0 otherwise. The Non-EU Partner variable equals 1 for
international JVs in which at least one partner comes from a country that does not
belong to the European Union, and 0 otherwise. Thus, domestic JVs —those in
which all the partners are Spanish— act as a reference for the behavior of these
variables. In general, the idea is that the greater the socioeconomic, political and
cultural distance between countries, the more difficult it is to achieve effectiveness
in a JV (Beamish, 1988).
Size: a variable that measures the size of a company participating in a JV in
terms of turnover. The purpose of including it is to tentatively analyze its effect,
while at the same time correcting any biases it may cause.
9Table 2. Correlation matrix
Results
The testing of the hypotheses formulated above was carried out in two stages.
During the first stage an ordered probit model was estimated for the whole sample, including
the aforementioned variables. Table 3 shows the results obtained. In the second stage, two
parallel estimations were carried out for the JVs created by two and more than two partners,
respectively, including the same variables as in the first stage, except, of course, for the one
relative to the number of partners. These estimations are presented in Table 4, which gives
the values of the coefficients of the different variables and the boundary values that limit the
Y* ranges for each model (as stated above, the first of the six is zero), along with
the standard deviation and an indication of the significance level of both. All the models
present satisfactory indicators of overall significance, with chi-square values that correspond
to significance levels of below 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis that all the estimated
coefficients are equal to zero may be rejected.
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12 34 5
1. Two partners 1
2. Previous alliances –0.02 1
3. Competitors 0.04 -0.07 1
4. CEO Shareholder –0.31 0.09 –0.06 1
5. Dominant Partner 0.16 -0.04 0.05 –0.23 1
6. Experience 0.08 -0.05 0.03 0.09 0.00
7. Size 0.04 0.08 -0.08 0.14 –0.02
8. EU Partners 0.10 0.15 0.01 –0.16 0.01
9. Non-EU Partner 0.14 –0.14 –0.13 0.03 0.22Table 3. Ordered probit model estimates: Full sample
(†) Beta coefficients and  boundary values —m— (standard deviations in brackets).
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Variables Coefficients†
Two partners 0.61 **
(0.29)


















MU (1) 0.68 ***
(0.17)
MU (2) 0.95 ***
(0.19)
MU (3) 1.40 ***
(0.22)
MU (4) 1.91 ***
(0.23)




* p<0.1                  ** p<0.05             *** p<0.01Table 4. Ordered probit model estimates: 
Dyadic JVs and Multi-party JVs Sub-samples
12
Variable name Dyadic JVs† Multi-party JVs†
Previous Alliances 0.26 *** 0.09
(0.07) (0.07)
Competitors –0.76 * –0.05
(0.42) (0.39)
CEO Shareholder 1.23 0.97 **
(4948.) (0.45)




Size 0.89 –2.32 **
(1.85) (1.10)
EU Partners –0.21 1.03 **
(0.48) (0.51)
Non-EU Partner –0.29 1.16
(0.54) (1.44)
Constant 1.28 ** 0.49
(0.64) (0.63)
MU (1) 0.74 * 0.78 **
(0.38) (0.27)
MU (2) 1.01 ** 1.11 ***
(0.41) (0.31)
MU (3) 1.40 *** 1.66 ***
(0.43) (0.39)
MU (4) 2.13 *** 1.98 ***
(0.45) (0.38)
MU (5) 2.84 *** 2.91 ***
(0.46) (0.55)
Chi-Squared 21.50 [p=0.006] 15.82 [p=0.045]
Cases 46 41
* p<0.1                 ** p<0.05              *** p<0.01As can be seen in Tables 3 and 4, the results of our estimations confirmed the vast
majority of the hypotheses formulated. Specifically, the Two Partners variable has the
appropriate sign and is statistically significant, thus confirming that in JVs with only two
partners there is a greater likelihood of the partners achieving their goals than in JVs with
more than two partners (Hypothesis 1).
The Previous Alliances variable has a positive effect on the likelihood of goal
achievement which is significant both for the sample as a whole and for two partner JVs, as
conjectured in Hypothesis 2. With regard to the Competitors variable, a negative effect on the
degree of goal achievement is observed which is significant only for two partner alliances,
thus confirming Hypothesis 3, which sustains that the likelihood of the partners being able to
achieve the goals for which the JV was created will be less when they are direct competitors.
The CEO Shareholder variable exerts a positive and significant influence, both for
the sample as a whole and for the sub-sample of JVs created by more than two partners. This
confirms that in this type of JV, the fact that the CEO is a shareholder increases the likelihood
of the partners’ achieving their goals (Hypothesis 4). However, the Dominant Partner variable
was not found to be significant for any of the sub-samples, and so Hypothesis 5, which states
that the existence of a dominant partner would have a favorable influence on the likelihood of
achieving goals, could not be accepted.
As far as the variables related to the psychological distance between the partners are
concerned, it is worth pointing out that the EU Partners variable has a positive and significant
effect on goal achievement, both for the sample as a whole and for the projects with more
than two partners. This result might indicate that JVs created by European partners are
backed by cooperation projects with greater synergy than those associated with domestic JVs.
Note, in this respect, that Spain’s integration in the European Union has increased the
interdependence between Spanish companies and those of the rest of Europe, with the
consequent possibility of undertaking joint projects that create value. The fact that the
influence of this variable is significant only in multi-party JVs might indicate that the most
solid ventures in this sense are those that require the participation of more than two partners.
Finally, with regard to the Size variable, our results demonstrate a negative effect on
the likelihood of achieving goals, which is statistically significant both for the sample as a
whole and for multi-party JVs. This result might be explained by the fact that underlying
multi-party JVs is the desire to reach a certain critical mass that will allow them to pursue a
particular activity more effectively; smaller companies with fewer resources are the ones that
will find this type of association most advantageous. The remaining control variables were
not found to be statistically significant. Estimations were carried out with industry group
dummies, without obtaining significant results. Finally, it is worth pointing out that the
marginal effects confirm the implications of the estimated coefficients in all the models.
Discussion
This study has considered how JV effectiveness, understood as the likelihood of the
partners’ goals being achieved, depends on whether the JV is dyadic or multi-party. We
expected that the likelihood of goal fulfillment in JVs with only two partners would be
influenced by the set of previous and concurrent relationships between the partners. We also
expected that these effects would be diluted in JVs with more than two partners, where we
expected monitoring mechanisms to have greater influence on the likelihood of goal
13achievement. There was support for most of our hypotheses (Tables 3 and 4) and, as is
discussed below, the overall pattern of results provides insights regarding the different paths
that may lead to greater effectiveness in dyadic and multi-party JVs. 
Our base-line hypothesis was that in JVs created by only two partners there would
be a greater likelihood of the partners being able to achieve their goals than in JVs created by
more than two partners. The results presented in Table 3 confirm that this is in fact the case.
In the following section we first discuss the results relating to the influence of relationships
on JV effectiveness, and then consider the results regarding the influence that monitoring
mechanisms have on effectiveness.
Relational effects
The results shown in Table 4 support Hypothesis 2: that in JVs created by two
partners the existence of previous cooperative relationships between the partners increases
the likelihood of achieving the goals for which the JV was created. This effect is not
significant in the case of multi-party JVs. These results are in line with our conjecture that
two partner JVs offer greater incentives than multi-party JVs to invest in relational assets. On
the one hand, maintaining a reciprocal relationship is easier when there are two partners than
when there are more than two (Parkhe, 1993c). Relational investments may therefore be
expected to have a higher payoff in dyadic relationships than in multi-party relationships.
When there are more than two partners, the effect of previous cooperative relationships is
diluted due to the fact that a relationship need not have been maintained with all the partners;
and cooperative behavior by only two of the partners may not be enough to achieve the
critical mass required for the synergy that the alliance is intended to generate.
On the other hand, as in dyadic JVs there are fewer interests to be harmonized, the
chances that the partners will find new common purposes that would make it worthwhile to
extend the relationship to new projects are greater than in multi-party JVs. Therefore, there is
a better chance that the partners will be able to capitalize on their relational investment, and
this provides a greater incentive to make the investment in the first place.
We also found support (Table 4) for Hypothesis 3: that in JVs created by two
partners, the likelihood of the partners being able to achieve the goals for which the JV was
created will be less when the partners are direct competitors. We did not find a significant
effect in the model for JVs with more than two partners. This factor has the opposite effect to
previous cooperative relationships. On the one hand, the fact that the partner is a competitor
poses a threat to any company entering a JV, as it may have a boomerang effect, which
discourages the firm from investing in relational assets. On the other hand, there is less
chance that the two companies will find new ground for future collaboration, which again
discourages relational investments. In the case of multi-party JVs, this effect is diluted. This
may be partly due to the way this variable is defined: in multi-party JVs, all of the partners do
not necessarily have to be competitors, as is the case in two partner JVs. However, it may
also have to do with the tendency for JVs among multiple competitors to be formed in
peripheral rather than core areas.  
Taken together, these results show that the effect of past and concurrent relationships
is diluted in the case of multi-party JVs. The greater incentives for relational investments in
two partner JVs compared with multi-party JVs —especially when the partners are not
competitors— translate into a greater likelihood of goal achievement in the case of dyadic
14JVs. This result complements earlier studies that have demonstrated the need to analyze
alliances within the set of relationships that exist among partners. In his pioneering study,
Kogut (1989: 184) suggests that “the transaction cannot be a unit of analysis in the absence of
a broader understanding of the relationships among the parties”. Zaheer and Venkatraman
(1995), Dyer (1997) and Madhock and Tallman (1998), among others, have shown how the
relationship itself and trust between partners is a specialized resource that facilitates both the
development of alliances and their governance. In this context, our results show that this
broader dimension of alliances exerts more influence in dyadic relationships than in multi-
party relationships. In fact, the empirical studies that have revealed the importance of
relational investments in governing cooperative relationships have tended to focus on dyadic
relationships, such as subcontracting (Dyer, 1997) or insurance distribution (Zaheer and
Venkatraman, 1995).
Monitoring mechanisms 
As can be seen in Table 4, the results confirm Hypothesis 4: that multi-party JVs in
which the CEO is a shareholder are more likely to achieve the partners’ goals than those in
which the CEO is not a shareholder. A JV’s management team may develop its own
independent goals for the JV —such as JV survival, or avoiding friction among the partners
(Schaan and Beamish, 1988). The incentive to adopt independent goals increases with the
number of partners, since the partners have fewer incentives to supervise the management
team’s work. When the CEO has an equity stake in the JV, the management team’s goals are
more likely to be aligned with those of the partners, and the CEO is likely to take more
interest in achieving the partners’ goals. When there are two partners, they need only one
channel of communication (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), so the role of the CEO as mediator
between the participating companies is not so important and she becomes more of an
executor of the partners’ strategic decisions. Also, the partners are able to control her work
more effectively, which discourages her from pursuing independent goals.
Hypothesis 5, which states that multi-party JVs in which there is a dominant partner
are more likely to achieve the goals for which they were created, did not find support (Table
4). Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that there are alternative theories which sustain that
balanced equity JVs favor cooperative behavior. In fact, the greater the inequality in the
distribution of shares, the greater the incentive for minority shareholding companies not to
cooperate, owing to their having a smaller share in the residual value of the JV (Park y
Russo, 1996). Beamish (1988), Blodgett (1992) and Saxton (1997) obtained evidence of
better performance in balanced equity JVs.
Conclusions
Although many studies have examined the conditions that influence the
effectiveness of JVs, few if any have focused on the differences between dyadic and multi-
party JVs. The analysis presented here shows that JVs with two partners and JVs with more
than two partners do differ in terms of their effectiveness. When compared to multi-party
JVs, dyadic JVs show a higher likelihood of goal achievement. Moreover, the effectiveness
of dyadic JVs is greatly influenced by the network of inter-partner relationships outside
the JV. In particular, the fact of having maintained previous cooperative relationships with the
15same partner increases the effectiveness of dyadic JVs, while having a competitor as a partner
diminishes it. On the other hand, the effectiveness of multi-party JVs is significantly affected
by the use of monitoring mechanisms. Specifically, the CEO’s having a share in equity is a
factor that enhances the effectiveness of multi-party JVs.
Overall, we have shown that the existence of embedded ties significantly influences
the effectiveness of dyadic JVs, but not that of multi-party JVs. The reason for this difference
lies in the fact that dyadic JVs provide greater incentives for investing in relational assets,
and more so when the partners are not competitors. Firms that have invested in relational
assets in previous cooperative relatioships with the same partner capitalize on these
investments in current JVs. In multi-party JVs there are fewer opportunities to capitalize on
relational assets built previously, so this effect is diluted. In this case, effectiveness is
explained by the existence of monitoring mechanisms.
Our results thus show that there are two paths for effectiveness in JVs: the
structuring of the JV as a self-enforcing agreement that promotes the development of a
long-lasting relationship embedded in a network of joint cooperative ties, and the
development of monitoring mechanisms. The former seems to be exclusive to dyadic JVs,
while the latter would be appropriate for JVs with more than two partners, as well as for
two partner JVs in which the development of a long-lasting relationship is not possible.
This research may be further developed in a number of ways. Companies may
cooperate and compete at the same time, and cooperative relationships may result in the
emergence of new competitors (Hamel, 1991). In what circumstances the forces of
cooperation overcome the forces of competition is a question that deserves further study. In
particular, it would be interesting to explore whether there are differences between dyadic
and multi-party JVs stemming from the stronger influence of relational effects in the former.
A second way to further develop this line of research would be to study the relationships
proposed here in a longitudinal fashion. Finally, it should be pointed out that there are several
types of multi-party alliances, as Hwang and Burgers (1997) have argued. Further research
should identify whether there are differences in the appropriate structuring of these different
types of multi-party alliances.
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